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Appellate Review of Sentences Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines In the Fifth Circuit
Henry D. Gabrier
Katherine A. Barskf"
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Sentencing Commission, through the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, issues the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.' The United States
Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch of the
federal government.2 The principal purpose of the Commission is to establish
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that
prescribe the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.
The guidelines and policy statements of the Commission are issued under the
authority of 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).'
The stated purpose of the Guidelines is to provide a fair and uniform
sentencing system that will aid the criminal justice system in combatting crime.
Primarily, the purpose of the Guidelines is to provide nationwide uniformity in
sentencing for federal crimes.' Because the Guidelines govern the sentencing
policies of all federal courts, and the coverage of the Guidelines includes more
than ninety percent of all felony and class A misdemeanor cases in the federal
courts,' the goal of uniformity has largely been met.
However, the Guidelines are statutory, and therefore subject to different
interpretations.! In addition, because many of the questions that arise in

Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law in New Orleans.
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to Judge Tucker L. Melanon, United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 35613566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988 and Supp. 1995) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 and Supp.
1995)) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
2. For a comprehensive history of the development of the United States Sentencing
Commission, see Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The PoliticsofSentencing Reform: The Legislative
History ofthe Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223 (1993).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
4. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1,Pt.A, intro. cmt.
5. For a discussion of the various purposes and goals of the Guidelines, see Marc Miller,
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1992).
6. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. cmt.
7. As an example of this, in drug cases the Guidelines base the length of the sentence on the
amount of "mixture or substance" of drugs involved. However, the Guidelines previously failed to
define what constituted "mixture or substance" and the courts failed to agree on a definition. The
Supreme Court, in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 45.3.
111 S.Ct. 1919.(1991), attempted to define
the term. Even then, the courts still diverged on attempts to define or apply the definition of"mixture
or substance." The Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits took the position that the term
"mixture or substance" excluded the weight ofunmarketable substances mixed with the drugs. United
"
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sentencing issues are factual, given the great deference accorded the findings of
the district court,' there will always be some disparity in the guideline applications, both among the various federal circuit and district courts throughout the
United States in the interpretation of the Guidelines, as well as in the factual
determinations by the district courts.
The Guidelines classify federal crimes by offense categories and focus on
the offender's criminal history to determine the appropriate sentence. The
Guidelines identify a sentencing range which is used to determine the length and
the type of sentence to be imposed.
The Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987,' and since that
date have generated an enormous amount of litigation. In 1995, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals published ninety-one opinions dealing with some
aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines."0 Because the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 virtually eliminates the sentencing court as a direct avenue
for review of sentences, all challenges to sentences must be made on direct
appeal." Thus, an understanding of the Sentencing Guidelines and their
application is essential for any attorney practicing criminal law in the federal
appellate court.
II. WHO MAY APPEAL
The Sentencing Reform Act provides a statutory basis for appellate courts
to review both the legality and severity of sentences. 12 Thus, the right to appeal

States v. Salgado-Molina, 967 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cis.
1992); United States v. Jennings. 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11 th Cir. 1991). The First, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits took the position that the weight of the unmarketable material mixed with the drugs
should be included in the weight for purposes ofdetermining the length of sentences. United States v.
Mahecha.Onofre, 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1009, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991); United
States v. Baker, 883 F.2d 13 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983, 110 S. Ct. 517 (1989); United States
v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 199 1). Effective November I, 1993, the Commission adopted the
position ofthe Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 484. Yet,
as the commentators have pointed out, the law is still somewhat disharmonious. See, e.g., Edward J,
Tafe, Comment, Sentencing DrugOffenders In Federal Courts: Dispariy and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 369 (1994); Joseph Rizzo, Comment, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: What Is the Fair
Interpretationof "Mixture and Substance"?, 14 Pace L. Rev. 301 (1994); Eric J. Stuckel, Comment,
"MixtureorSubstance ": Continuing Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 2D).). 12
Touro L. Rev. 205 (1995).
8. United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 247 (1996); United
States v. Madison, 990 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 929, 114 S. Ct. 339 (1993);
United States v. Humphrey, 7 F.3d 1186 (5th Cir. 1993).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
10. This figure was determined by using the following Westlaw search: [di(110) and

date(1995) and sentencing w/2 guidelines]. The number of published opinions dealing with
sentencing issues during the 1993-94 term were 106.
I1. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1992).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (1992).
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is a statutory right, not a constitutional right. 3 Title 18, section 3742 of the
United States Code governs who may appeal.
A. Defendant
A defendant may file a notice of appeal if the sentence (1) was imposed in
violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
Sentencing Guidelines; (3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable
guideline; or (4) was imposed for an offense for which no sentencing guideline
has been issued and is plainly unreasonable."4
B. Government
The government, with the approval of either the Attorney General or
Solicitor General, may appeal if the sentence (1) was imposed in violation of
law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the Sentencing
Guidelines; (3) is less than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which no sentencing guideline has been
issued and is plainly unreasonable." Approval of the Attorney General or
Solicitor General is required to ensure that the government does not routinely file
appeals for every sentence below the appropriate guideline range. 6 However,
appeals of unreasonably lenient sentences are necessary to reduce unwarranted
sentencing disparity. 7 The Senate Judiciary Committee, relying on a United
States Supreme Court decision," asserted that such appeals would not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Circuit has concurred. 9
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Understanding the applicable standard of review is an essential first step in
*preparing an appeal. The appellate court uses the standard of review to
determine whether an error has occurred in the trial court that warrants a remedy
on appeal. Therefore, determining which standard ofreview applies aids counsel
in deciding which potential appellate issues may warrant pursuing. There are

13.

United States v. Melangon, 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992) (right to appeal is statutory right

which may be waived).
14.
15.

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1992).
18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (1992).

16.

18 U.S.C. §3742(b) (1992).

17. S. Rep. No. 225, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334.
18. S. Rep. No. 225, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334-35, relying on United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980) (double jeopardy does not prevent review of a
Government's statutorily authorized appeal of a defendant's sentence).
19. United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Crain
v. U.S.. 508 U.S. 915, 113 S. Ct. 2354 (1993) (no double jeopardy when defendant had expectation
government would appeal illegal sentence).
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three standards which generally will apply: the de novo standard, the clearly
erroneous standard, and the plain error standard. Even after applying the proper
standard of review and determining that an error was committed, the appellate
court may review that error under an additional standard, harmless error review,
to decide whether relief is warranted.
A. DeNovo
The de novo standard of review is the least restricted standard. The
appellate court will make a new and independent review of the issues to which
this standard applies. If the issue on appeal is purely legal, the de novo standard
applies." Issues that the Fifth Circuit has determined to be purely legal and
2
subject to de novo review include: issues involving constitutional questions; '
issues involving an interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines;' issues
arising out of an application of the Sentencing Guidelines;23 and issues of
whether the Sentencing Commission adequately considered particular circumstances in formulating the Sentencing Guidelines. 2' The de novo standard also
applies if the issue on appeal requires the reviewing court to consider
questions involving both fact and law and to exercise judgment about legal
principles.2s
B. Clearly Erroneous
The clearly erroneous standard results in a more restrictive review. This
standard applies to factual findings which, under the clearly erroneous standard,
are accorded great ("due") deference to the sentencing judge's application of the
Sentencing Guidelines to the facts.26 The "due deference" standard was added
to federal law in November 1988.2 The Fifth Circuit has held that the "due

20. United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 868 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,492 U.S. 924, 109 S.
Ct 3257 (1989).

21. United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225 (5th Cir. 1994).
22. United States v. Ford, 996 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct.
704 (1994).
23. United States v. Marsh, 963 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d
664 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 261 (1995).
24. United States v. Harpe, 932 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 970, 112 S. Ct.
443 (1991). The authority of the Sentencing Commission to make a particular Guideline
determination is reviewed as an issue of statutory construction. United States v. Cheramie, 51 F.3d

538 (5th Cir. 1995).
25. United States v. Siciliano, 953 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Shipley, 963 F.2d
56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 925, 113 S. Ct 348 (1992).
26. United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 247 (1996); United
States v. Madison, 990 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 929, 114 S. Ct. 339 (1993);

United States v. Humphrey, 7 F.3d 1186 (5th Cir. 1993).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
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deference" standard did not create a new standard of review. 28 The "due
deference" standard means that the appellate court will review the sentencing
court's fact-based application of the Guidelines only for clear error." A finding
is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite affirmed
conviction that a mistake has been committed.30 Under the clearly erroneous
standard, a sentencing court's conclusions on issues of fact will rarely be
overturned.
The clearly erroneous standard has been used to review such fact-based
issues as whether the defendant was a minor participant in the criminal
activity;3 whether the defendant was an organizer or a manager of the criminal
offense;3 whether the defendant obstructed justice;" and the determination of
relevant conduct.'
C. Plain Error
0

For an appellate court to review an alleged sentencing error, the defendant
or government must raise the issue, usually through an objection, at sentencing.Ys If the error was not raised below, the appellate court will consider the
claim only if it constitutes "plain error."3 The Fifth Circuit has established
four factors that are to be considered when determining whether there has been
plain error.3" First there must be an "error," and second, that error must be
"plain," meaning it must be "clear" or "obvious. ' 38 The third factor requires
the error to affect "substantial rights," which usually requires a showing of

28. United States v. Mejia.Orosco, 868 F.2d 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S.
Ct. 3257 (1989). See atso Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992).
29. United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Franco-Torres, 869
F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1989).
30. United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994).
31. United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110
S. Ct. 1957 (1990).
32. United States v. Barreto, 871 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1989).
33. United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1993).
34. United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1565

(1994).
35. United States v. Francies, 945 F.2d 851, 852 (5th Cir. 1991).
36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Ebertowski, 896 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1990) (district
court committed plain error by placing defendant in criminal history category VI after determining
not to apply career offender Guideline); United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1327-29 (5th Cir.
1992) (plain error when government made sentencing recommendation in violation of plea
agreement); United States v. Bullard, 13 F.3d 154, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (no plain error
when district court applied wrong Guidelines and decreased offense level for responsibility acceptance
because no miscarriage ofjustice resulted); United States v. Franks, 46 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995)
(plain error when district court applied wrong section of Guidelines in assigning base offense level).
37. United States v. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.denied, 115 S. Ct.
1157 (1995).
38. Id.
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prejudice. 9 Fourth, the court looks for a mistake that is "so obvious that
failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings and result in a miscarriage of justice."'
Given the minimal nature of the review, the appellate court considers all of the

evidence in the record to determine whether the entire record supports the
imposition of the sentence.'
D. Harmless Error
If an appellate court finds that an error was committed, the sentence may
still be affirmed if the error was harmless. 2 An error is harmless if it does
not affect the defendant's substantial rights.'
In other words, an error is
harmless if the reviewing court is sure, after viewing the entire record, that the
error did not influence the judge or jury or had only a slight effect on the
result." In sentencing review, if the sentence was imposed either in violation
of law or as a result ofan incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines, the
case is4 remanded for new sentencing and the harmless error analysis does not

apply. S

IV. SOURCES OF SENTENCING ISSUES

The Sentencing Guidelines themselves are not a major source of
sentencing issues on appeal, but some constitutional challenges to the
individual Guideline sections can be raised. The interpretation and
application of the Guidelines as well as the imposition of sentence
constitute the greatest source of potential appellate issues. Each of these sources
of issues will be addressed in turn and include such areas as the interpretation
of the Guidelines, the determination of the applicable offense level, departures
from the Guidelines, plea agreements, and the determination of the sentencing
range.

39. Id. The defendant rather than the government bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.
40. United States v. Pattan, 931 F.2d 1035, 1043 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 958,
112 S. Ct. 2308 (1992). See also United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
ceri. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995).

41. Patton, 931 F.2d at 1043. See also Calverley, 374 F.3d at 610.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 279
(5th Cir. 1992) (errors in sentencing were harmless); United States v. Bounds, 943 F.2d 541, 545-46
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,510 U.S. 845, 114 S. Ct. 135 (1993) (failure to advise defendant in open
court of possibility of supervised release was not harmless under the circumstances).
43. United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 712 (1996).
44.

Id.

45. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202,112 S.Ct. 1112, 1120(1992); United States
v. Stephenson, 887 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goff v. U.S., 493 U.S. 1086, 110 S.Ct.
1151 (1989).
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A. Sentencing Guidelines
1. Interpretationof Guidelines
The Guidelines consist of text and commentary. The commentary may
interpret the Guideline or explain how it is to be applied. 46 With limited
exceptions, courts must treat the Guidelines commentary as binding.47
"Commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is
inconsistent with, or plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."
Other
portions of the commentary express the policy ofthe Commission and should be
treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement. 49
2. Application of Guidelines
The Sentencing Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987, and the
Guidelines apply to offenders who commit crimes on or after that date."
Defendants who are convicted of crimes that began before the effective date and
continued after are subject to the Guidelines.5 These crimes are known as
"straddling crimes."5 2 The most common straddling crimes are conspiracy
offenses. 3 Ifa defendant is convicted ofa conspiracy that straddled the effective

46. U.S.S.G. § IB1.7.
47. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 37,113 S. Ct. 1913,1915 (1993); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7.
Generally, an amendment to commentary that merely "clarifies" the meaning of the Guideline is
retractive. However, the circuits are split on whether a "clarifying" amendment to commentary
should be applied retroactively when it conflicts with circuit precedent. Compare United States v.
Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 507 U.S. 942, 113 S. Ct. 1343 (1993)
(not retroactive); United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1407 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.denied, 116
S. Ct. 1425 (1996); United States v. Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir. 1993) with United States v.
Garcia-Cmz, 40 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1994) (amendment retroactive despite contrary precedent);
Unites States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 895, 114 S. Ct.
259 (1993); Unites States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1347 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1097. 112 S. Ct. 1177 (1992); United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292. 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991). cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1061, 112 S.Ct. 943 (1992).
48. Stlnson, 508 U.S. at 37, 113 S.Ct. at 1915; United States v. Ortiz-Granados, 12 F.3d 39,
42-43 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Neal v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 763 (1996) (when sentencing
guideline conflicted with federal statute, federal statute applied).
49. U.S.S.G. § IBI.7.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988 and Supp. V 1993); S. Rep. No. 225, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3372.
51. United States v. Van Nymgen, 910 F.2d 164, 166 (Sth Cir. 1990). But see United States
v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 198 (fth Cir. 1994) (Guidelines not applied to pre-November 1, 1987 portion
of continuing mail fraud offense).
52. Id.
53. United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112, 109 S.
Ct. 3172 (1989) (conspiracy offenses are "straddle" crimes).
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date, the Guidelines apply even ifhe undertook no overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy after the effective date.$
The Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing must be applied, rather
than the Guidelines in effect at the time the offenses were committed."
Similarly, the Guidelines in effect at the time of resentencing after remand
should be applied.- However, if amendments occur after the defendant's
offense, but before sentencing, the amendments should not be applied if doing
so would increase the sentence because that would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution." Instead, the Guidelines in effect at the date that
the offense was committed should be used.5"
"A criminal law is ex post facto if it is retrospective and disadvantages the
offender by altering substantial personal rights."" A law is retrospective if it
changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date."
The mere possibility of a higher sentence under the revised Guidelines, even
though not actually proven, is sufficient to affect one's substantial personal
rights. 6 Thus, Sentencing Guideline amendments that subject a defendant to
the possibility of increased punishment violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
a. Offense Level
The court must determine the applicable offense Guideline section. 62 Each
offense has a corresponding base offense level which may be adjusted for any
specific offense characteristics contained in the particular Guideline. 3 The
burden of proof rests with the government to prove any fact necessary for the
sentencing court to determine the base offense level." When the statutory
index lists more than one potentially applicable Guideline, the district court must
choose, from among the Guidelines specified, the one that is most appropriate
based on the nature of the offense conduct.' 5

54, United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1332 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1065,
112 S. Ct. 954 (1992).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988); U.S.S.G. § IBI.11.
56. United States v. Gross, 979 F.2d 1048, 1052.53 (5th Cir. 1992).
57. United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mills,
9 F.3d 1132, 1136 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993). See also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.
58. U.S.S.G. § IBI.11.
59. United States v. Gonzales, 988 F.2d 16, 18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 858, 114 S.
Ct. 170 (1993) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987)).
60. Gonzales, 988 F.2d at 18.
61. Id.
62. U.S.S.G. § IBI.1.
63. U.S.S.G. Ch. 2, intro. cmt. This article does not address all offense Guidelines, but is
limited to the more frequently used sections.
64. Id. The standard is the preponderance of the evidence standard. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
65. United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053, 1061 (5th Cir. 1996) (district court is without
authority to create a "compromise" base offense level).
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b. Use of Guns to Determine Offense Level
One factor that is used in the determination of the base offense level, and
that has generated much litigation, is whether a firearm was used during the
offense. Title 18, section 924(c)(1) of the United States Code is a separate
offense that requires the imposition ofspecified penalties ifthe defendant "during
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... uses or
carries a firearm." In a recent United States Supreme Court case, the Court
clarified the term "use." 7 The Court held that a conviction under a statute
which criminalizes the "use" of a firearm during and in relation to an offense
requires more than a showing of mere possession." The evidence must be
sufficient to show active employment of the firearm by the defendant in such a
way that the firearm is an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense."
In addition to this separate offense, the Sentencing Guidelines mandate a
two-level increase for the possession of a weapon by a drug defendant.7 The
increase should be applied if the weapon was "present" during, and connected
with, the offense.7 Several circuits have held that once the government
satisfies its initial burden of showing that the weapon was present, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to show that the weapon was not connected to the
offense.' However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the burden is on the
government to establish a relationship between a defendant's possession of a
weapon and the offense." The possession of a weapon is established if the
government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a "temporal and
spatial relationship [existed] between the weapon, the proscribed activity, and the
defendant." 74
When the weapon was possessed by a co-defendant, the enhancement may
be applied if the possession was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has held that "one co-conspirator may ordinarily
be assessed a § 2Dl.1(b)(1) increase in view of another co-conspirator's
66.

18 U.S.C. § 924(cXl) (1988).

67.

Bailey v. United States, 116 S. CL 501 (1995).

68.

Id. at 508.

69. Id. See also United States v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fike,
82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996).
70. U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I(bXI).
71. U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1 cmt. 3.
72. United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Roberts, 980 F.2d
645, 647 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1992); United
States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1222 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294,
1296 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 1097 (6th Cir. 1989).
73. United States v. Siebe, 58 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1995). This holding is consistent with
the Eighth Circuit. United States v. Khang , 904 F.2d 1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1990).
74. United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337 (Sth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1310 (1994)).
75. U.S.S.G. § IBI.3 cmt. 2; United States v. Aguilera-Zapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir.

1990).
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possession of a firearm during the drug conspiracy so long as the use of the
weapon was reasonably foreseeable." 76 A court may infer that a defendant
should have foreseen a co-conspirator's possession of a dangerous weapon if the
government demonstrates that another participant knowingly possessed a weapon
while he and the defendant committed the offense."
This enhancement may be applied even if the defendant was acquitted of a
charge of using or carrying a firearm during a drug offense. 8 The Fifth Circuit

has held that, "while a conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a
district court may sentence a defendant within the Sentencing Guidelines on any
relevant evidence that 'has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy."',
c. Stipulations to Offense Level
In the case of a conviction by a guilty plea containing a stipulation that
specifically established a more serious offense than the offense of conviction,
the total offense level is determined based on the stipulated offense.'s Stipulations that establish a more serious offense than the offense of conviction must
be set forth in a written plea agreement or on the record during the plea
proceeding."' The Fifth Circuit has cautioned courts to "proceed with due
deliberation" when using section lB 1.2(a), holding that "the determination that
the stipulation contained in or accompanying the guilty plea 'specifically
establishes a more serious offense' than the offense of conviction must be
expressly made on the record by the court prior to sentencing. 8 2 Moreover,
"the trial court must follow the directive contained in Fed. R. Crim. P. 1l(f) and
satisfy itself that a 'factual basis for each essential element of the crime [has
been] shown."s

d. Relevant Conduct
A major factor that is used in determining the applicable Guideline range is
an accumulation of all the defendant's pertinent activity, also known as "relevant

conduct." A defendant's base offense level for the offense of conviction must
be determined on the basis of all "relevant conduct" as defined in section IB1.3
of the Sentencing Guidelines." Relevant conduct includes "all acts and

United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 114 S.Ct. 1310 (1994).
United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 559 (5th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Buchanan,.70 F.3d 818, 828 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. §6A1.3; United States v.Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 1995)).
80. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a).
81. U.SS.G. § IB1.2 cmt. 1; Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 111 S.Ct. 1854 (1991).

76.
77.
78.
79.
82.
83.

84.

United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 75.
United States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1995).
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omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured,
or willfully caused by the defendant."SS Thus, a defendant is held responsible
(1) for certain conduct that was part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction and (2) for the conduct of others that
was reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance ofjointly undertaken
activity."6
Conduct described in counts of the indictment to be dismissed, conduct
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations, conduct that is the subject of a
pending state proceeding, as well as evidence that would be suppressed and not
available at trial may all be considered in determining relevant conduct.'7
Sentencing courts are even permitted to consider unadjudicated offenses which
occur after the offense of conviction." Although this may seem to result in
double jeopardy, this protection in the context of sentencing proceedings has
been virtually eliminated because the courts have held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause precludes a second punishment for the same "offense," not a second
punishment for the same conduct.69
The determination of whether the conduct of others was reasonably
foreseeable to a defendant should be made using an objective standard of
what would have been foreseeable to a reasonable person in the position of the
defendant, rather than the subjective standard of what the particular defendant
knew." In conspiracy cases, the general rule is that co-conspirators are
liable for losses occasioned or amounts of drugs distributed or agreed to be
distributed by their co-conspirators." However, this rule is limited to
conduct that occurs after the defendant joined the conspiracy. 2 Mere knowledge that criminal activity is taking place is not enough. The government
must establish that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake criminal activities
with another, and that the particular crime was within the scope of that
agreement.'"

85. U.S.S.G. § 1BI.3(aXIXA).
86. Id. at (B). See United States v. Ashbum, 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.), vacatedinpart, 38 F.3d
803 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1969 (1995).
87. Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1336; United States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 840 (5th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Rosogie, 21 F.3d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1994).
88. VMal, 68 F.3d at 118.
89. United States v. Cruce, 21 F.3d 70, 77 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct.
2849, 2860 (1993); Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2206 (1995).
90. U.S.S.O. § IBI.3 cmat. 2.
91. United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1861
(1994) (relevant conduct could include all drugs distributed by conspiracy even though defendant
didn't personally distribute).
92. United States v. Carreon, I1 F.3d 1225, 1230-34 (5th Cir. 1994) (adefendant's sentence
for relevant conduct may not be enhanced based on other conspirators' conduct that occurred before
the defendant joined the conspiracy).
93. United States v. Eubuomwan, 992 F.2d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1993).
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B. Adjustments
Adjustments to the base offense level are allowed (1)for harm to the victim,
(2) for the defendant's role in the offense, (3) for an obstruction ofjustice, (4)
if the defendant was convicted on multiple counts, and (5) if the defendant has
accepted personal responsibility."
1. Victim-Related
Three possible victim-related adjustments may be applied to a wide variety
of offenses."6 First, if the defendant knew or should have known that a victim
of an offense was unusually vulnerable because of age, physical or mental
condition, or other particular susceptibility, the base offense level is increased
two levels." The adjustment is appropriate to any offense, not just the charged
one, as long as the victim's vulnerability played some part in the defendant's
decision to commit the crime.9" The vulnerability must be unusual because,
otherwise, the defendant's choice of a likely victim does not demonstrate the
enhanced measure of criminal depravity which the Guidelines intended to punish
more severely."
Under the second possible victim-related adjustment, the base offense level
will be increased three levels if the victim of the offense was a state or federal
official or a member of the official's immediate family and the crime was
motivated by the victim's status." This adjustment is typically applied in cases
in which the defendant has been convicted of an offense against a police or
probation officer.'I
Under the third possible victim-related adjustment, the base offense level
will be increased two levels if a victim was physically restrained during the
course of the offense."0 "Physically restrained" means forcible restraint where
the victim is tied, bound, or locked up."0 2 This enhancement is inapplicable

94. U.S.S.G. §§ IBL.1(c), (d), (e).
95. U.S.S.G. § 3AI intro. cmt.
96. U.S.S.G. § 3AI.I; United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1993) (§ 3A1.I
applied when mail fraud victims were specifically targeted, elderly widows who sought companionship through lonely hearts pen pal magazine).
97. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597,608 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861 (1989).
98. United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335 (5th Cir. 1990).
99. U.S.S.G. § 3AI.2(a).
100. United States v. Kings, 981 F.2d 790, 793 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 953, 113 S.Ct.
2450 (1993) (§ 3A1.2 applied to assault against federal officer).
101. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3.
102. U.S.S.G. § IBI.1 cmL I(i). Two circuits have held that this definition of "physically
restrained" is not all-inclusive and that the enhancement may be warranted for other forms of
restraints. Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 913, 112
S. CL 312 (1991); United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990).
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if restraint is an element of the charged offense, or is specifically incorporated
into the base offense level."0 3
2. Role in Offense
There are various adjustments for the defendant's role in the offense that are
based not only on the defendant's role, but also on the number of participants in
or the extensiveness of the offense."° A participant is one who is "criminally
responsible" although not necessarily convicted Oss The defendant's role is
based on all relevant conduct and "not solely on the basis of elements and acts
cited in the count of conviction."' 06 The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this
language to mean that adjustments may apply even if the defendant was the only
participant in the offense of conviction as long as the "criminally responsible"
persons participated in the conduct considered by the court in determining the
defendant's role in the offense.1ro
If the defendant had a leadership or supervisory role in criminal activity that
involved five or more participants, the defendant's base offense level will be
increased three or four levels depending on the "exercise of decision-making
authority" and the "degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense."'"6 The base offense level is increased only two levels for a leader,
organizer, manager, or supervisor of criminal activity that involved fewer than
five participants.""' The rationale underlying this adjustment is rooted in the
belief that leaders tend to profit more from the offense, present a greater danger
to society, and are more likely to recidivate." 0 The Fifth Circuit has held that
a defendant does not have to personally lead all the participants to receive this
enhancement, but must lead at least one of the participants." A connent to
this Guideline provides that an upward departure may be warranted if a
defendant did not lead one or more other participants, but the defendant did
exercise "management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a

103.
104.

U.S.S.G. § 3AI.3 cmt. 2.
U.S.S.G. §§ IB1.l(c), 3B1.1.

105.

U.S.S.G. § 3B.I cmt.

106. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt. B, intro. cmt.
107. United States v. Rodriguez, 925 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1991) (defendant found to control
two persons even though others not necessarily participants in offense conviction).
108. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 4.; United States v. Ronning, 47 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (§
3B .Ierroneously applied because defendant was partner with, not leader of, co-defendant); United
States v. Okoli, 20 F.3d 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1994) (§ 3B1.1 applied when defendant recruited and
directed co-defendant). When counting the "five or more participants," the defendant may be counted
as one of the five. United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494, 1498 (5th Cir. 1990).
109. U.S.S.O. § 381.1(c).
110. U.S.S.G. § 3B1. cmt.
Ill. Okoli, 20 F.3d at 616. Accord U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 2 ("the defendant must have been
the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants").
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The Fifth Circuit, however, has noted that this
criminal organization.""'
exception, by definition, cannot be used to impose an enhancement under this
Guideline because one cannot organize or lead property, but only people." 3
If the defendant was a minor participant in the criminal activity, the base
offense level is decreased two levels." 4 A minor participant is defined as one
who is substantially "less culpable than most other participants.'" If the
defendant was a minimal participant in the criminal activity, the base offense
level is decreased four levels." 6 A minimal participant is defined as one who
is "plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of the
group."0" 7 This reduction only applies if the defendant's role in the offense
makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant." Because
there is a presupposition of a defendant's lack of involvement in the underlying
offense, any adjustment for reduced culpability in an offense must be based on
a mitigating role in that offense, not the underlying crime." 9 The circuits
differ on whether the court must state for the record its finding of fact about the
defendant's mitigating role." The Fifth Circuit, in holding that the court is
required to make factual findings on the record, reasoned that the determination
of the participant's role is a complex fact question which cannot be properly
reviewed unless there is an adequate record. "' The circuits that do not require
a record of factual findings have noted that while such a record would more
clearly inform the defendant and would aid the appellate court in reviewing the
the judge to state
determination, because there is no express legal requirement 2for
2
reasons, the circuit court will decline to impose one itself.

112. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.I cmt. 2.
113. Ronning, 47 F.3d at 712. Contra United States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 1995)
(departure under comment two may be proper when defendant, who did not control others, had
responsibility for the property of the criminal organization). The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have
held, prior to the issuance of comment two, that a defendant who manages or supervises property
rather than people may be a manager or supervisor under section 3Bl.l(b). United States v.
Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1268 (4th Cir.), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 834, 114 S. Ct. 107 (1993); United
States v. Carson, 9 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 1993). cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 135 (1994).

114.

U.S.S.G. § 381.2(b).

115.
U.S.S.G. § 31.2 cmt. 3; United States v. Marmolejo, 95-20983, 1997 WL 73833 at $4 (5th
Cir. Feb. 21, 1997).

116.
117.
118.

U.S.S.G. § 3BI.2(a).
U.S.S.G. § 381.2 cmts. 1 and 2; United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th Cir. 1996).
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt.; United States v. Davis, 19 F.3d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (§ 3BI.2

did not apply when defendant rode in car knowing victim was in trunk). The reduction is not
warranted solely because other co-defendants are more culpable. United States v. Thomas, 963 F.2d
63, 65 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[e]ach participant must be separately assessed").
119. United States v. Godbolt, 54 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995).
120. United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991) (required); United States v.
Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1991) (not required to make factual finding of relative
culpability among co-defendants); United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612, 615 (10th Cir. 1990)
(not required).
121. Melton, 930 F.2d at 1099.
122. Donaldson, 915 F.2d at 615.
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"Ifthe defendant abused a position ofpublic or private trust, or used a special
skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of
the offense, [the base offense level is increased] two levels."" "Special skill"
refers to a skill not possessed by the general public,' and a position of public or
private trust is "characterized by professional or managerial discretion.""' For
this enhancement to apply, the "special skill" or "position of trust must have
contributed in some significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment
of the offense."' 2 ' Persons possessing these traits are generally viewed as more
culpable because they possess "substantial discretionaryjudgment that is ordinarily
given considerable deference."'2 7 This adjustment does not apply if an abuse of
trust is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic."
3. Obstruction ofJustice
If a defendant willfully obstructs or impedes, or attempts to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the offense, the base offense level is increased two levels."
Acts that encompass an obstruction of justice include: testifying untruthfully;
lying to authorities; fleeing arrest; disposing of or concealing material evidence;
and influencing witnesses." ° The obstruction must occur during the investiga-

123. U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3; United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th Cir.), cet. denied,
502 U.S. 1008, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991).
124. U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3 cmt. 2; United States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 601 (5th Cir. 1992). cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S.Ct. 1651 (1993) (§ 3B1.3 applied when defendant used knowledge as
attorney to avoid detection).
125. -U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3 cmt. I; Brown, 7 F.3d at 1162 (§ 3BI.3 applied when defendant used
position as a prison food service manager to operate scam).
126. U.S.S.U. § 3B1.3 cmt. 1.
127. Id.
128. U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3; United States v. Fisher, 7 F.3d 69, 70 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an
abuse of trust is not an element of embezzlement).
129. U.S.S.O. § 3C1.1; United States v. Velgar-Vivero, 8 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 1993), cer.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1865, 2715 (1994) (the increase is not discretionary); United States v. Tello, 9
F.3d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1993) (§ 3C1.1 applied when defendant failed to disclose prior criminal
history to probation officer); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 861, 110 S. Ct. 175 (1989) (provision refers to efforts to obstruct "instant offense').
130. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 1; United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1482 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 898, 996, 114 S.Ct. 266, 560 (1993) (before arrest defendant assumed new name
in new state); United States v. McDonald, 964 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1992) (use of alias under
oath); United States v. Rodriguez, 942 F.2d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080,
112 S.Ct. 990 (1992) (use of alias with probation officer); United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300, 306
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 888, 112 S.Ct. 247 (1991) (defendant had co-conspirator threaten
and shoot at person); United States v. Edwards, 911 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1990) (failure to
disclose location of co-conspirator after instructed to do so); United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669,
677 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 621 (1992) (attempting to flee arrest);
United States v. Galvan-Garcia, 872 F.2d 638, 641 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 857, 110 S.Ct.
164 (1989) (throwing marijuana out of car during flight).
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tion or prosecution of the offense of conviction.' 3' The Fifth Circuit has
interpreted this language to mean that the enhancement may not be based on a
defendant's attempts to conceal the crime prior to the investigation or prosecution.' However, the Fifth Circuit has noted that the enhancement may apply
when the obstruction "occurs with [the defendant's] knowledge of an investigation, or at least with the defendant's correct belief that an investigation is
probably underway."' 33 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that the obstruction of justice enhancement involves "both a temporal requirement and an
awareness requirement. " ' These requirements reflect the notion that the
defendant should cooperate and comply with authorities once government action
has been initiated and the defendant is aware of such action.'35
A plain reading of section 3C 1.1 compels the conclusion that the provision
should be read only to cover obstructions to the investigation of the "instant
offense."'' However, although the Guidelines clearly contemplate a relationship between information concealed and the offense conduct, the Guidelines do
not require that the information concealed be
related directly to a particular
s37
offense of which the defendant is convicted.
Though the court may not penalize a defendant for denying his guilt as an
exercise of his constitutional rights, a sentence may be enhanced if the defendant
commits perjury.' 3' A defendant commits perjury if he "gives false testimony
concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony"
while testifying under oath.'39 When a defendant challenges the application of
section 3C1.1 in such a situation, the district court must make an independent
finding of willful pejury beyond the court's or jury's mere disbelief of the

131. Roberson, 872 F.2d at 609.
132. United States v. Luna, 909F.2d 119, 120(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d
234, 235 (5th Cir. 1990). The commentary to section 3C1.1 has been revised along these same lines,
stating that if such conduct occurred at the time of arrest it shall not warrant an adjustment for
obstruction unless it actually hindered the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.
U.S.S.G. § 3C.1 CmL 4. The Seventh Circuit has held contrarily, stating that the focus is not on
timing but on materiality. United States v. Polland, 994 F.2d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied. 510 U.S. 1136, 114 S.Ct. 1115 (1994).
133. United States v. Lister, 53 F.3d 66, 71 (5th Cir. 1995) (enhancement affirmed for a
defendant who suspected that an informant making a drug buy was actually a police officer and
threatened to have her killed if he was later arrested).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848. 852 (10th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit has not yet
made this determination.
137. United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791,798 (5th Cir. 1995) (enhancement for obstructing justice
proper for defendant's conduct in urging witness not to cooperate with government regarding other
charges contained in same indictment).
138. United States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87.91(5th Cir. 1995), cert.denied, 116 S.Ct. 714 (1996);
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98. 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1119 (1993).
139. Dannigan,507 U.S. at 94, 113 S.Ct. at 1116.
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defendant's testimony reflected in a guilty verdict." ° The Fifth Circuit has
held that a court should also make explicit findings when, over the government's
objection, the court refuses to make an obstruction adjustment for perjury."'
Obstructive conduct under section 3C1.1 may not be used to enhance
sentences for offenses in which the defendant has been convicted of obstruction
ofjustice, such as contempt, perjury, or bribery, except if further obstruction of
justice occurred during the prosecution or investigation of these offenses. 42
However, once the court finds facts sufficient to constitute obstruction ofjustice,
the enhancement is mandatory, regardless of other mitigating behavior." 3
4. Multiple Counts
When a defendant is convicted of multiple counts, the Guidelines require
that counts involving substantially the same harm be grouped into distinct
"Groups of Closely-Related Counts."'" This is so that a single offense level
that encompasses all the counts of which the defendant is convicted can be
determined. Counts that involve the same victim and acts or transactions
connected by a common scheme or plan involve the same harm and should be
grouped for purposes of determining the applicable offense level.'" The
reason is that some offenses that may be charged in a multiple count indictment
are so closely intertwined with other offenses that conviction for them ordinarily
would not warrant increasing the Guideline range. The Fifth Circuit has warned,
however, that the courts should avoid bootstrapping dissimilar counts that may
arise from the same transaction.'
An example of counts that should be grouped is when "the defendant is
convicted of kidnapping and assaulting the victim during the course of the
kidnapping."'4 7 However, if "the defendant is convicted of two counts of
assault on a federal officer for shooting at the officer on two separate days," then
these counts should not be grouped together.""

140. Dunnigan,507 U.S. at 95,113 S. Ct. at 1117; United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523,531 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied. 115 S. Ct. 1116 (1995) (§ 3C1.1 applied when defendant committed pejury).
141. United States v. Humphrey, 7 F.3d 1186. 1190 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanded for specific
finding on whether defendant committed pejury).
142. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt 4.
143. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 609 (5th Cir. 1989).
144. U.S.S.O. §§ 1B1.1(d), 3D1.l(a), 3DI.2; United States v. Patterson, 962 F.2d 409,417 (5th
Cir. 1992) (grouping is appropriate when defendant convicted of multiple counts).
145. U.S.S.O. § 3DI.2(b); United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir. 1991) (grouping

is not appropriate when offenses not related); United States v. Packer, 70 F.3d 357. 360 (5th Cir.
1995), celL denied, 117 S. Ct. 75 (1996) (failure to appear count did not have to be grouped with

other offenses for sentencing purposes).
146.
147.
148.

Patterson,962 F.2d at 415; Gallo, 927 F.2d at 824.
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. 4.
Id.
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When counts are grouped, courts should also apply any relevant adjustments
to each count before grouping." 9 Once the correct offenses are grouped and the
applicable adjustments have been made, a combined offense group results. The
combined offense level is determined by using the offense level ofthe most serious
offense in that group.se The combined offense level is then used to adjust the
defendant's final offense level."'1
5.Acceptance ofResponsibility
If the defendant accepts responsibility for his offense, the base offense level
must be reduced by two levels.1'5 While courts have broad discretion to grant or
deny the reduction for acceptance of responsibility,' the sentencing court must
reduce the offense level by all or nothing. A one-level reduction is not permitted.5 4
The reduction only applies ifthe defendant has clearly and affirmatively shown
evidence of acceptance of responsibility.' 5 Although the entry of a guilty plea
prior to trial accompanied by a truthful admission ofconduct is significant evidence
of acceptance of responsibility, this does not warrant a per se reduction."" In
addition, a reduction will not automatically be precluded if the defendant goes to
trial, especially when a defendant goes to trial strictly to preserve procedural
issues.'
Because there is no hard-and-fast rule on what constitutes acceptance
of responsibility, great deference is given to the sentencing judge's evaluation of
the facts to determine a defendant's acceptance of responsibility.' 8
This reduction has been challenged on the grounds that the possibility of a
reduction encourages guilty pleas in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination." 9
The Fifth Circuit has rejected constitutional challenges to the facial validity of the
reduction for a defendant's acceptance of responsibility." ° However, there is a
split in the circuits about whether the denial ofthe reduction for refusal to reveal

149.

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3 CmL. 2.

150.

U.S.S.G.

§ 3DI.

151. U.S.S.G. §3D.
152. U.S.S.O. §§ 1B1.1(e), 3El.1(a).
153. United States v. Lghodaro, 967 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1992).
154. United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1992).
155. United States v. Wilder, 15 F.3d 1292, 1298 (5th Cir. 1994) (reduction denied because
defendant blamed others and impeded investigation, but pled guilty on eve of trial).
156. U.S.S.G. § 3E.I cmt.3; United States v. Calvereley, 37 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995) (reduction denied even though defendant pled guilty
because defendant committed peujury).
157. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt.2; United States v. Chapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1995).
158. U.S.S.G. § 3EL.I cmt. 5; United States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1995).
159. United States v. Bermea,30 F.3d 1539, 1577 (5th Cir. 1994) (denial of reduction does not
violate privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d 945 (5thCir. 1992)
("affording a possibility of a more lenient sentence does not compel self-incrimination').
160. Id.
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or admit to potentially self-incriminating information violates the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth, along with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that it does
not.' These circuits reasoned that the purpose of this Guideline was to formalize a tradition ofleniency toward contrite defendants, and that to find the Guideline
unconstitutional would result in defendants who express genuine remorse not being
rewarded at sentencing, which is a result not required by the Constitution.'" The
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held, however, that a sentencing court cannot
consider against a defendant any constitutionally-protected conduct. 163 Similarly,
the First, Second, and Third Circuits have held that denial of the reduction is a

"penalty" rather than a "denied benefit."'" Nevertheless, because the acceptance
of responsibility determination is so fact-based, a hard-and-fast rule on the
constitutionality of this Guideline will be unlikely.
A 1992 amendment added an additional one-level reduction for certain timely
acceptances of responsibility.'" The extra reduction may not be denied once the
requirements of the Guideline section have been met.'" The Fifth Circuit has
formulated a three-part test for determining if the Guideline requirements are met:
1)the defendant qualifies for the basic 2-level decrease for acceptance of
responsibility under subsection (a); 2) the defendant's offense level is 16
or higher before reduction... under subsection (a); and 3) the defendant
timely "assisted authorities" by taking one-but not necessarily both--of
two "steps": either (a) "timely" furnishing information to the prosecution
about defendant's own involvement in the offense; or (b) "timely"
notifying the authorities that the defendant will enter a guilty plea."
The court determined "timeliness" to be recognized in only two "discrete areas: I)
the prosecution's not having to prepare for trial, and 2)the court's ability to manage
its own calendar and docket."'16
C. Criminal History/Career Offender
After determining the "total offense level," the sentencing court must
determine the defendant's criminal history category and whether the defendant is

161. United States v. Clemons, 999 F.2d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Frazier, 971
F.2d 1076, 1080 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
162. Id.
163. United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 195 (1lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Watt, 910
F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1990).
164. United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 658 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Oliveras, 905
F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1990): United States v. Perez.Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989).
165. U.S.S.G. § 3E.1(b).
166. United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1124.28 (5th Cir. 1993).
167. Id. at 1124-28.
168. Id. See also United States v. Mills, 9 F.3d 1132, 1137 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the "Tello
test").
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a career offender."' Each prior sentence of imprisonment of more than thirteen
months is assigned three criminal history points. 70 Each prior sentence of
imprisonment ofsixty days or more, but less than thirteen months, is assigned two
criminal history points.' Prior sentences imposed in related cases are to be
treated as one sentence.'7 "Prior sentences are not considered related if they
were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest. Otherwise, prior
sentences are considered related ifthey result from offenses that (I) occurred on the
same occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were
consolidated for trial or sentencing."" n The assignment of points is based on
actual judgments entered, not time served. 74
An upward departure is permitted if when counting consolidated sentences as
one sentence, a defendant's criminal history is underrepresented.'" For example,
ifa defendant was convicted of several serious offenses that were committed on
different occasions but were tried together, the treatment of these offenses as
consolidated may result in a lower number of criminal history points than would
result ifthe offenses were each tried separately. 7' In such situations, an upward
departure is permitted to compensate for the underrepresentation ofthe defendant's
criminal history and the danger he presents to the public. In addition, the court may
depart from the Guidelines when the criminal history category does not adequately
reflect the seriousness ofthe defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood of
recidivism.'"
Harsher sentences at or near the maximum term authorized will be given to
"career offenders.""' A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was
at least eighteen years old at the time of the offense; (2) the offense of conviction
is a felony that is within a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and

169. U.S.S.G. §§ IBI.I(), 4AI.I, 4B1.I.
170. U.S.S.G. § 4A 1.1(a). Prior sentences of imprisonment of more than 13 months must have
been imposed within 15 years of the commencement of the instant offense or have resulted in
incarceration during any part of the 15 year period to be counted. Id. § 4A1.2(eX1); United States
v. Radziercz, 7 F.3d 1193, 1195 (Sth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1575 (1994) (criminal
history category correct because defendant would have been incarcerated 15 years prior to instant
offense but for escape).
171. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.1(b). Prior sentences of 13 months or less must have been imposed within
10 years of the commencement of the instant offense to be counted. Id. § 4A1.2(eX2); United States
v. Cain, 10 F.3d 261, 262 (5th Cir. 1993) (criminal history category correct even though defendant

given credit for time served).
172. U.S.S.G. § 4AI.2(aX2).
173. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(aX2) cmt. 3.
174. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cnt 2.
175. United States v. Geiger. 891 F.2d 512, 513 (5th Cir. 1989).
176. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 3.
177. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; United States v. Rosogie, 21 F.3d 632,634 (5thCir. 1994); United States
v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1969 (1995); United States v.
Lambert, 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
178.

U.S.S.G. § 4BI.i.
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(3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.'"
A crime of violence is defined as an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force or any offense that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used."
The
Guidelines interpret this to include "murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, extortionate extension of credit, forcible sex offenses, arson, and
robbery."'"' In determining whether an offense is a "crime of violence," the Fifth
Circuit has held that "only conduct 'set forth in the count of which the defendant
was convicted' may be considered in determining whether the offense is a crime of
violence. " "'
The circuits are split over whether the career offender provision covers drug
conspiracies. Almost all the circuits have held that it does.18 3 However, the Fifth
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have held that it does not.'" In a matter of statutory
interpretation, the two circuits found that a conviction of conspiracy does not
constitute an offense that triggers a career offender enhancement because the
Sentencing Commission lacked statutory authority for the Guideline.' However, in a 1995 amendment to the commentary of this Guideline, the Commission
responded to these two circuits' opinions by explaining that the "general guideline
promulgation" authority of the Commission was relied on when setting the
definition oi career offenders.6 Thus, it appears that the Commission may have
resolved the split by making the career offender provision applicable to drug
conspiracies in all the circuits. The Fifth and D.C. Circuits may not be influenced
by the Commission's explanation, however.

179.

Id.

180. 18 U.S.C. § 16, incorporated by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
181. U.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 cmt. 2. The United States Supreme Court has held that the unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon is not "by its nature" a crime of violence. Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 46-47, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1920 (1993) (applying comment 2 to section
4BI.2).
182. United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing U.S.S.G. §4Q1.2).
183. United States v. Mendoza-Figueros, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995) (on bane); United States
v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Weir, 51 F.3d 1031, 1032 (11th Cit. 1995); United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d
611, 616 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 888 (4th Cit. 1994); United States
v. Damerville, 27 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hightower, 25 F.3d 182, 186 (3d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Heim, 15
F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1994).
184. United States v. Bellazerius, 24 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Price, 990
F.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
185. United States v. Cheramie, 51 F.3d 538. 543 (5th Cir. 1995) (because § 4B1. 1was enacted
under the authority of 28 U.S.C. 994(h), which does not list conspiracy offenses, conspiracy offense
cannot constitute a triggering offense).
186. U.S.S.G. § 4B1. (background commentary).
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D. Determining the Sentence
1. Presentence Investigation Report
Prior to the imposition ofa sentence, the court's probation officer must conduct
an investigation of the defendant and report to the court pursuant to Rule 32(b) of
the Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure. The presentence investigation report and
the defendant's objections to that report are essential considerations in proper
sentencing because the report forms the factual basis for the judge's sentencing
determination." 7
The presentence investigation report must contain: (1) the history and
characteristics of the defendant, including his prior criminal record and any
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that might be helpful in
sentencing; (2) the Guideline categories, types of sentences and sentencing range
that the probation officer believes apply to the particular case, and an explanation
of any factors that might warrant departure; (3)pertinent policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission; (4) the impact of the crime on the victim; (5) the
nature and extent ofnonprison programs available to the defendant; (6) any report
and recommendation resulting from a court-ordered study ofthe defendant; and (7)
any other information that may be required by the court in sentencing."
The presentence report must be completed unless the court offers reasons why
it is unnecessary.'" The defendant may not waive preparation of the report."90
Subject to certain exceptions, the court must disclose the report to the defendant,91
the defendant's counsel, and the prosecutor before the sentencing hearing.'
Although the report bears a sufficient indicia ofreliability to permit the sentencing
court to rely on it at sentencing,"92 the court must give the defendant and defense
counsel an opportunity to comment on the report before imposition of the
sentence.1 93 However, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
report is inaccurate."4

187.
188.

United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1989).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(bX4); 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (1988).

189. Id.
190. U.S.S.G. § 6AI.. Congress deleted the provisions of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) which
permitted the defendant to waive the presentence report.
191. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(bX6).
192. United States v. Ayala, 47 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1995).
193. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(bX6)(B).
194. United States v. Gracia, 983 F.2d 625, 629 (5thCir. 1993). See alsoUnited States v. Terry,
916 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Isirov, 986 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1993). This rule is not
uniformly followed and several circuits have taken the position that once the defendant objects to
findings in the presentence report, the burden then shifts to the government to prove these facts by
a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Logan, 54 F.3d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1117 (1995).
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2. PleaAgreements
The procedures governing plea agreements are contained in Rule I I of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'" The sentencing court is not bound by
stipulations contained in a plea agreement.'" However, a defendant who has
entered into a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence under Rule
Il(e)(1XC) ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may appeal a sentence that
is greater than that set forth in the plea-bargain agreement.'" Likewise, the
government can appeal ifthe sentence is lower than the agreement.'"
While a plea of guilty typically waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the
proceedings below,'" where the intervening law has established that a defendant's actions do not constitute a crime and thus that the defendant is actually
innocent of the charged offense, this rule does not apply.2' ° This interpretation
is significant in light of Bailey."' The Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant may
withdraw his plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) in light of Bailey's change
in the law, if applicable.' n
Plea agreements in which the defendant has waived his right to appeal the
conviction as well as the sentence are permissible as long as the defendant's waiver
is informed and voluntary. 3 When the plea agreement contains a waiver of
appeal ofsentence provision, the defendant must know that he had a right to appeal
his sentence and that he was giving up that right.' In recent cases, even though
the application of the Guidelines has been disputed at the sentencing hearing, the
Fifth Circuit has upheld the waiver ofappeal ofsentence provisions and summarily
dismissed the appeal.O
3. Sentencing Range
The appropriate sentencing range is chosen by identifying the range in the
sentencing table that corresponds to the defendant's total offense level and criminal

195.
196.
197.

U.S.S.G. § 6BI.l.
U.S.S.G. § 6BI.4(d); United States v. Galan, 82 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 1996).
18 U.S.C. § 3742(c) (1988).

198.

Id.

199. United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1993); Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d
847, 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
200. United States v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1996).
201. Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. United States v. Melangon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992).
204. Id. See also United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 244
(1994) (district court's failure to specifically admonish defendant concerning waiver-of.appeal
provision in plea agreement did not render defendant's waiver of right to appeal sentence uninformed
and invalid).
205. United States v. Williams, 30 F.3d 1492 (5th Cir. 1994) (table).

1008

8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

history category.' Within this range, the judge must choose a sentence that is
consistent with the overall Guidelines. In determining the particular sentence, a
judge must consider the broad concerns and purposes of the Sentencing Reform
Act. These concerns and' purposes include the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences
available, the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, and the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense.'
The judge may consider any relevant information concerning the defendant's
background, character, and conduct.' However, any facts considered by the
court must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.' The defendant
bears the burden of establishing a factor that would result in a reduction of his
sentencing range, 1 0 while the government bears the burden of establishing a
factor that would result in an enhancement ofthe defendant's sentencing range.2" '
Emphasizing that an indictment is not evidence, the Fifth Circuit has held that an
indictment is not itself sufficient to establish a material fact under the Sentencing
Guidelines." In addition, the sentencing court may not rely on allegations that
are mere conclusion made by a law enforcement agent or a prosecutor.1 3
E. Departuresfrom the Guidelines
The sentencing judge may depart from the Guidelines only if (1) the
government makes a motion for a downward departure based on substantial
assistance,1 4 or (2) the judge finds that the particular case includes an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that the Commission did not adequately consids
2

er.

1

206. U.S.S.O. § IBlI.(a)-(g).
207. ISU.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(7) (1988).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988); U.S.S.G. § 6AI.3; United States v. Schmeltzer, 20 F.3d 610, 613
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 634 (1994) (court properly considered information in presentence
report that was not in indictment and plea agreement).
209. United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 860, 864 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2151 (1994)
(reliance on presentence report on drug quantity permitted even though quantity differed from jury's
finding).
210. United States v. Angulo, 927 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1991).
211. United States v. Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cir. 1990).
212. United States v. Williams, 22 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 367 (1994).
213. United States v. Elwood, 999 F.2d 814, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Patterson,
962 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1992).
214. U.S.S.G. § SKI.I; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (n) (1988); United States
v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 185, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992); United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276, 279
(Sth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1551 (1994).
215. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; 1 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). Although the parties can make a motion
for departure, the ultimate decision to depart rests with the judge. United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d
30, 35-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 647 (1993) (upward departure based on injury to third
party was justified); United States v. Burleson, 22 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 283
(1994) (downward departure not justified because defendant possessed a gun).
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1. Government Motion
The government's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion for downward
departure can be reviewed by the courts, and a remedy may be granted if the refusal
is based on an unconstitutional motive or is not rationally related to any legitimate
government end.2 6 However, because the government has the power, and not the
duty, to file a motion, the defendant must make a threshold showing of substantial
assistance before he is entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing on the
issue.2
Nevertheless, if a plea agreement contains a commitment by the
government to file a motion in return for the defendant's cooperation, the defendant
may be able to seek specific performance of the agreement."' The Fifth Circuit
has held that if a defendant relied on the government's promise and "accepted the
government's offer and did his part, or stood ready to perform but was unable to do
so because the government had no further need or opted not to use him, the
government is obligated to move for a downward departure." '19 The Fifth Circuit
has also stated, however, that when the plea agreement "expressly provides that the
government retains absolute discretion to move for a downward departure.... the
defendant is not entitled to relief' unless the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive.'
This requirement that the government must make a motion for downward
departures based on substantial assistance has been upheld against due process
challenges,U the reasoning being that defendants have no constitutional right to
a substantial assistance departure. Thus, they cannot claim that the government
motion requirement unconstitutionally limits the discretion of sentencing
judges.'
The decision to depart downward pursuant to a motion by the
government is left within the discretion of the sentencing judge.' In addition,
the district courts are not limited by the government's recommended sentence,'
"While giving appropriate weight to the government's assessment and recommendation," the court must make an independent determination of the "propriety and
extent of any departure in the imposition of sentence." 2 S

216. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86, 112 S. Ct. at 1843-44; United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d
45, 47 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1112, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989).
217. Wade, 504 U.S. at 186-87, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
218. United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 551-52 (5th Cir. 1993).
219. United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1098'(5th Cir. 1991). See also United States v.
Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1995).
220. Garcla-Bonilla, II F.3d at 47.
221. United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1990).
222. Id.
223. United States v. Franks, 46 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d
194, 198 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Darner, 910 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 991 (1990).
224.
225.

United States v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 10.

1010

0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

2. AggravatingorMitigating Circumstances
Under aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court can depart
from the Guidelines range and impose a greater or lesser sentence. District courts
can depart from the applicable Guidelines range if "the court finds that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described."'
To
determine whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration by the
Commission, courts should "consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary ofthe Sentencing Commission. '" A judge
can depart downward based on a victim's conduct, lesser harm, coercion and
duress, or diminished capacity during a nonviolent offense. 2' s The burden is on
the defendant to prove that he has met the requirements that would warrant a
downward departure. 9
Contrarily, ajudge may depart upward ifthe offense involved death or physical
injury, extreme psychological injury, abduction or unlawful restraint, property
damage or loss, possession or use of weapons and dangerous instrumentalities,
disruption ofa government function, extreme conduct, the facilitation or concealment of the commission of another offense, danger to public welfare, or terrorism.2" The United States Supreme Court has held that
before a district court can depart upward on a ground not identified as a
ground for upward departure either in the presentence report or in a
prehearing submission by the Government, [rule 32 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure] requires that the district court give the parties
reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a ruling. This notice must
specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure.2'l
Factors that may not be used by the courts as aggravating or mitigating
circumstances include the defendant's race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
or socioeconomic status; community standards; or likelihood of recidivism."2
226.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). See also Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).

227.

Id.

228. U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.10, 5K2.11, 5K2.12, 5K2.13.
229. United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1996).
230. U.S.S.O. §§ 5K2.1-.9, 5K2.14.
231. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991). See also United States v. Moore, 37
F.3d 169, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1994).
232. U.S.S.O. § SHI.10; Koon v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996) (the district court abused
its discretion by considering the low likelihood of recidivism because the Commission took that
factor into account in formulating the criminal history category); United States v. Harrington, 82 F.3d
83,87-88 (5th Cir. 1996) (district court abused its discretion in considering the fact that the defendant
was ajudge for purposes of an upward departure); United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 677 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 261 (1995).
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In addition, except in extraordinary circumstances, other factors such as age,
physical condition, education, and family and community ties may not be
considered. 3 Use of a factor already adequately considered in the Sentencing
Guidelines or discouraged by the Sentencing Commission policy statements to
justify a departure from the Guidelines is an incorrect application of the
Guidelines unless the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other
way that makes the case different from an ordinary case. '
3. Scope of Review
If the departure is within the statutory limits, the court will review for
"abuse of discretion."" A discretionary decision by the district court not to
depart from a properly calculated sentencing range is not appealable and should
The sentencing judge must clearly
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.'
express the reasons for any departure from the Guidelines.237 If the departure
is justified, the length of the departure must be reasonable in light of the grounds
specified by the court."' The fact that the departure is several times higher
than the maximum range under the Guidelines, standing alone, is not determinative of the reasonableness of the sentence.2' However, when a district court
Guidelines by
intends to depart above Category VI, it should stay within 2the
4
considering sentencing ranges for higher base offense levels. '
If the decision to depart is based in part on an invalid factor, resentencing
is necessary, unless the reviewing court determines that the sentencing court's
reliance on the invalid factor was harmless.t The Fifth Circuit has declined
to extend this review to a district court's determination of the extent of
departure. 2 2 Instead, the Fifth Circuit has held that "the decision as to the
extent of departure is committed to the almost complete discretion of the district

233. U.S.S.G. §§ 5H.1-.9; United States v. Woolford, 896 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. '1989).
234. Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2035; Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 200, 112 S. Ct. 1112,
1119 (1992).
235. Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2035; United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1310 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Rosogie, 21 F.3d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1994).
236. United States v. DiMarco, 46 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d
737, 745 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cr. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S. CL 1957 (1990).
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
238. Id. See also United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Velasquez-Memcado, 872 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir.), cert.denied,493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 187 (1989).
239. United States v. Lopez-Escobar, 884 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1989).
240. United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
241. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1120 (1992); Kay, 83 F.3d
at 98.
242. United States v. Alvarez, 51 F.3d 36, 40 (5th Cir. 1995).
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court, which may consider factors beyond the narrower set that could independently support the departure in the first instance. '243
F. Imposition of Sentence

Rule 32(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the
imposition of sentence. Under Rule 32, a court must impose the sentence
without unnecessary delay.2" The sentencing judge is not required to state the
reasons for imposing a sentence that is within the applicable range if the range
does not exceed twenty-four months. 4' Otherwise, the judge, at the time of
sentencing, must state in open court the reasons for the imposition of a particular
sentence. 2"
The sentence that the district judge imposes generally determines the length
of imprisonment, although prison terms may be shortened by credits awarded for
satisfactory behavior after the first year, 247 and a sentence may be modified or
credited on review. In certain circumstances, the judge has discretion to impose
probation, imprisonment, or supervised release..24
A judge must order
restitution for certain crimes and must impose a fine in all cases unless the
defendant is unable to pay and not likely to become able to pay. 249
G. ConstitutionalChallenges
Another source of sentencing issues, apart from the interpretation and
application of the Guidelines, is the United States Constitution. While
constitutional challenges are incorporated into many of the issues arising from
the interpretation and application of the Guidelines, some fact-based challenges
outside of the application of the Guidelines exist. The United States Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines,' stating that the Sentencing Commission was
not an excessive delegation of legislative power by Congress and was not a
violation of the separation of powers principle. 25 ' Nevertheless, a defendant
may be able to raise individualized, fact-based constitutional challenges to his
sentence.

243. Id. at 41.
244. Fed R. Crim. P. 32(aXI).
245. United States v. Richardson, 925 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir.), cert.deniedsub norn. Boudreamu
v. United States, 501 U.S. 1237, 111 S.Ct. 2868 (1991).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988); United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 30, 36 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 647 (1993).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
248. U.S.S.G. §§ 531.1, 5C1.I, 5D..
249. U.S.S.G. §§ 5EI.l(a). 5E1.2(a), (f).
250. Mistrett v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). See also United States v.
Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 206 (Sth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009, 112 S. Ct. 1773 (1992).
251. Mistreta,488 U.S. at 361, 109 S. Ct at 647. See also Guajardo,950 F.2d at 206.
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1. Cruel and UnusualPunishment
The imposition of a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on persons convicted of
a crime." The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has been interpreted to
limit "what can be made criminal and punished as such." ' 3 Accordingly,
M the
Clause has been used to prohibit "grossly disproportionate" punishments.2
The Fifth Circuit generally will not disturb a sentence imposed for a
noncapital felony conviction if the sentence falls within the statutorily prescribed
limits, unless the sentencing judge commits an abuse of discretion in imposing
the sentence." As long as the sentence is within the guideline range, the court
will usually simply deny the Eighth Amendment challenge without any
analysis.'5 The court reasons that it is not within its purview to replace the
judgment of the legislature in adopting the Guidelines with the judgment of the
court.'" Applying this standard, the Fifth Circuit has been reluctant to
overturn a sentence under the Guidelines based on an Eighth Amendment
challenge.2 8 This is consistent with the views of the other circuits," which
have followed the guidance of the United States Supreme Court in finding that

252. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct, 1401 (1977).
253. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667, 97 S.Ct. at 1410.
254. Id.
255. United States v. Prudhome, 13 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1866
(1994); United States v. Badger. 925 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1991).
256. See. e.g., United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fisher,
22 F.3d 574 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 529 (1994).
257. United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1993).
258. Id. (100-month imprisonment for convicted felon charged with illegally entering U.S.,
within applicable Guidelines; not constitutionally disproportionate); Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287,
1294 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1185, 114 S.Ct. 1236 (1994) (a sentence is not
disproportionate just because it exceeds a co-defendant's sentence); United States v. Williams, 919
F.2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1990) (when defendant violates the terms of supervised release, additional
prison terms are not excessive even though the combined total of both terms exceeds the statutory
maximum term for the underlying offense). See also United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 320
(5th Cir. 1991) (the possibility of parole, although a factor in determining the proportionality of a
sentence, does not foreclose review when a defendant is sentenced to a serious offense).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1996) (harsh penalties are not an
Eighth Amendment violation where sentence was within Guidelines); United States v. Lombard, 72
F.3d 170 (Ist Cir. 1995) (sentencing court cannot impose its own sense of fairness in place of
Guidelines); United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367 (11th Cir. 1995) (Eighth Amendment claim limited
to question of disproportionality only); United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1995)
(penalties are not an Eighth Amendment violation where sentence was within Guidelines unless so
grossly out of proportion as to shock our sense ofjustice); United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639 (6th
Cir. 1994) (Eighth Amendment claim requires gross disproportionality); United States v. Nicholson,
17 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1994) (penalties are not an Eighth Amendment violation where sentence was
within Guidelines); United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 1994) (successful challenge to
constitutionality of sentence very rare).
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the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality
principle.'
2. Due Process
The Fifth Circuit has held that the Sentencing Guidelines as a whole do not
violate due process, even though they prevent individualized sentencing by
establishing mandatory sentences for offenses, because individualized sentencing
is not required by the Constitution."6 However, the Fifth Circuit has entertained more specific due process challenges. One area in which the court has
granted due process relief is the determination of sentencing facts.'
While
sentencing facts must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard
rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard,163 due process forbids the
sentencing judge from relying on materially false or unreliable information. 2"
However, the government's use of hearsay evidence at sentencing, including
corroborated out-of-court statements by unidentified informants, is not a violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights to due process.26s
Another area of due process concern is the imposition of a harsher sentence
when a defendant exercises a constitutionally protected right. Due process
forbids the sentencing judge from vindictively inflicting a harsher punishment on
the defendant for exercising his constitutional right to trial or the privilege
against self-incrimination.2 " Evidence that a harsher sentence resulted from
a defendant exercising his rights must be clear.267 However, if a judge imposes
a harsher sentence after retrial than was initially imposed at the first trial, a
rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness may arise. 268 This presumption may
also apply if a harsher sentence is imposed for remaining counts after some

260. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991) (upholding mandatory, nonparolable life sentence imposed upon accused convicted of possession of more than 650 grams of

cocaine).
261. United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009,
112 S. Ct. 1773 (1992).
262. United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1993).
263. United States v. Carmon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1241 (Sth Cir. 1994).
264. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49, 92 S. Ct. 589, 591-93 (1972) (due process
requires that the defendant not be sentenced on the basis of "misinformation of a constitutional
magnitude'); United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1993) (dictum)
(due process requires that sentence be based on information with "sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accumacy").
265. United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 980, 113 S.
Ct. 2983 (1993) (the district court did not err in considering at sentencing information provided by
confidential informants who were neither identified nor presented for cross-examination).
266. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1969), overruled in
part,Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802-03, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2206-07 (1989).
267. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1162 (5th Cir. 1993).
268. Pearce,395 U.S. at 725, 89 S. Ct. at 2080. This presumption does not apply when the first
sentence was imposed after a guilty plea. Smith, 490 U.S. at 794, 109 S.Ct. at 2201.
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counts have been set aside on appeal.'
There is no presumption of vindictiveness if, after remand, the defendant's aggregate sentence is equal to or less
than his original sentence.7
To overcome the presumption of vindictiveness, a judge must justify the
harsher sentence based on identifiable conduct of the defendant which the judge
" ' Thus, a sentencing judge
became aware of after the original sentencing.27
may impose a harsher sentence based on conduct or events subsequent to the first
trial.'
The judge may also impose an increased sentence based on new
evidence and testimony relating to events that occurred prior to the first trial."
The reasons for the harsher sentence must be stated on the record." 4 The Fifth
Circuit has held, however, that the presumption of vindictiveness can also be
overcome by evidence that at resentencing the judge implicitly or expressly

lacked vindictive motivation.2
3. EqualProtection

Another constitutional provision that provides a source of sentencing issues
is the Equal Protection Clause. To prevail on an equal protection claim, the
defendant must prove "the existence of purposeful discrimination" in which the
276
sentencing decision was made because of, not in spite of, disparate impact.
"Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that the decision
maker selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, and not

simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable
group.'
Because the Guidelines are applied in a facially neutral way to all
defendants, understandably this is a heavy burden. The Fifth Circuit has been
reluctant to find this burden met under the Guidelines.
For example, one area which has been challenged repeatedly under the Equal

Protection Clause is the disproportionality between the sentences for powdered
cocaine and crack cocaine."
The Fifth Circuit has held that the Equal
269. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S. Ct. at 2080; Smith, 490 U.S. at 794, 109 S. Ct. at 2201;
United States v. Vonsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (th Cir.) (en banc). cert.denied, 505 U.S. 1223,
112 S. Ct. 3039 (1992) (harsher punishment must be imposed by the same judge that sentenced the
defendant previously for the presumption to apply).
270. United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 30, 37-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1029, 114 S.
Ct. 647 (1993) (resentencing not required when sentence after appeal and remand was exactly the
same as original sentence).
271. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081.
272. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571-72, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3224.25 (1984); United
States v. Schmeltzer, 20 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 634 (1994).
273. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 141-44, 106 S.Ct. 976, 980-82 (1986).
274. Id.
275. United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.denied, 485 U.S. 1022,
108 S.Ct. 1577 (1988).
276. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987).
277. United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992).
278. Id.

1016

LLOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Protection Clause is not violated by the crack cocaine provisions of the
Guidelines which provide higher penalties for crack cocaine convictions as
opposed to powdered cocaine convictions, even though a disproportionate number
of African-Americans are sentenced for crack cocaine violations than for
powdered cocaine.2" Every circuit which has considered this issue is in accord
with the determination by the Fifth Circuit regarding the Equal Protection
Clause.m
4. FreeSpeech
The First Amendment, as a constitutional mandate, takes priority over a
federal statute, and therefore a sentencing judge is precluded from considering
the defendant's First Amendment protected political or religious beliefs. The
judge, however, can consider racial motivation for a crime under the Constitution."8 The reason2 for this is that bias-inspired conduct is not protected by the
First Amendment. 2
5. Right to a Jury Trial
The Fifth Circuit has consistently rejected sentencing issues that claim to
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Specifically, the
Sentencing Guidelines are not unconstitutional even though they permit the
district court to resolve factual disputes at the sentencing hearing without the
benefit of a jury." 3 The problem of concern is that a court can use factual
determinations of the defendant's "relevant conduct" for purposes of setting the
sentence, although the evidence of the conduct was not presented to the jury.
Thus, the defendant might be sentenced for conduct for which the jury did not
convict him. The Fifth Circuit has simply chosen 2to affirm this as constitutional
without ever fully explaining its constitutionality. U

279.

Id.

280. United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200 (2d. Cir. 1995); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d
1423 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v.
Williams, 982 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259 (11th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218

(6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas,
900 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1990).
281. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,483, 113.S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) (First Amendment
not violated by penalty enhancement statute even though higher penalties assessed for bias-motivated
offenses because statute aimed at bias.inspired conduct not protected by First Amendment).
282. Id.
283. United States v. Harris, 932 F.2d 1529, 1539 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.

Ct 270 (1991).
284. Id.
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V. PROCESS WHEN ERROR IN SENTENCING

If the appellate court finds that there are sentencing errors that warrant
correction, the case is remanded to the sentencing court for further proceedings
that may include a correction or reduction of the sentence imposed. The
application of the Guidelines on remand are subject to the same scrutiny as if
originally applied. In addition, there are additional procedures that must be
followed by the sentencing court when applying the appellate court's determinations.
A. Remand
If the appellate court determines that a sentence was imposed in violation of
law, or as a result ofan incorrect application of the Guidelines, or if the sentence
is outside the applicable Guidelines range and unreasonable, the court must
remand the case with any instructions it deems appropriate. 83 In concluding
that remand is necessary, the appellate court must give due regard to the district
court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses and factual findings."'
If the appellate court concludes that a sentence is outside the applicable
*Guidelines range and is unreasonable, or that it was imposed for an offense for
which there is no Guideline and is plainly unreasonable, the court must state
specific reasons for its conclusions."' This allows the sentencing court to
properly apply the appellate court's conclusions after the case is remanded.
B. Correction and Reduction of Sentence
A sentence can be modified only after a successful appeal or for extraordinary and compelling reasons. 2' The district court may reduce a sentence prior
to a successful appeal in a narrow set of circumstances.2t 9 The district court
may reduce a defendant's sentence if a change in the offense guidelines under
which the defendant was sentenced results in a lower Guideline range.2 In

285. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), (f)(1992). But see United States v. Mills, 9 F.3d 1132, 1139 (5th Cir.
1993) (case not remanded when district court left no doubt that the defendant should be sentenced
to maximum under Guidelines without upward departure).

286.

18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1992); United States v. Burleson, 22 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 283 (1994).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0(2) (1992).
288. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b), (c) (1988).
289. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(IXA) (1988).
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(cX2) (1988); U.S.S.G. § IBI.10 (policy statement). The sentencing court
must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Recently, both the Fifth and Second Circuits have held that the right to appointed counsel under
the Criminal Justice Act does not extend to a motion for reduction of sentence based on an
amendment to the Guidelines because this isnot an "ancillary matter." United States v. Whitebird,
55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1995).
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addition, a district court has the authority to correct its own obvious errors in
sentencing within the time fixed for either party to file an appeal."' The
district court is also permitted, on a motion made by the government within one
year after the imposition of the sentence, to reduce a sentence to reflect a
defendant's subsequent,
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
92
of another criminal.
Generally, however, a district court may correct a sentence only following
a successfid appeal of the sentence. 93 On remand, the district court is required
to correct the sentence either according to the appellate court's findings or, if the
appellate court simply remands for further proceedings, according to the district
court's own determination of whether the original sentence was correct. 2"
Thus, if no instructions are given by the appellate court, the district court has
substantial discretion to correct the sentence on remand.29 Because such a
correction is the imposition of a new sentence, the defendant is entitled to be
present at the resentencing.296
VI. CONCLUSION

The Commission drafted the initial Guidelines with considerable caution.
However, the Commission is a permanent body that can amend the Guidelines
each year.29 7 These amendments, along with the growing body of case law,
will make Guideline law ever more detailed. For this reason, the number of
cases interpreting this area of the law will continue to increase rapidly. Many
issues will be resolved as additional information is obtained. Nevertheless, new
issues will arise with each amendment and uncertainties will continue to result
and constitute a source of appellate issues.

291.
18 U.S.C. § 3582 (1988); Fed. R. Cnim. P. 35(c).
292. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 600 (1994).
The Fifth Circuit has held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a Rule 35(b)
proceeding. United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996).
293. Fed. R. Crim.P. 35 (a); United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 655 (Sth Cir. 1991).
294. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a).
295. United States v. Vonsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1088-90 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1223, 112 S.Ct. 3039 (1992).
296. Fed. R. Crim.P. 43(a); Moree, 928 F.2d at 656. But see United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d

22, 23 (Sth Cir. 1993) ("[W'here the entire sentencing package has not been set aside, a correction
of an illegal sentence does not constitute a resentencing requiring the presence of the defendant, so
long as the modification does not make the sentence more onerous.").

297.

U.S.S.O. Ch. I, Pt A.

